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ELECTORAL EXPRESSION WITH 
INSTITUTIONAL BOUNDS: FRAMING 
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ELECTIONS 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
David Bullock 
This article explores the way in which the courts have treated cases involving electoral 
broadcasting in New Zealand. Cases involving electoral broadcasting have been decided on a range 
of approaches. This article uses an "institutional" conception of elections to determine whether 
certain bounds can be drawn to define a category of election expression, comprising certain rules 
and norms, which the courts can use when dealing with expression around elections. New Zealand's 
case law to date is broadly consistent with an institutional model of electoral expression within 
which a higher level of judicial scrutiny of broadcasters is exhibited. This paper proposes that an 
express recognition of this institutional conception would provide some clarity and unity to 
decisions involving the sensitive issue of electoral broadcasting. 
I INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand authorities on electoral law appear infrequently. This is possibly due to the 
"subsidiary role" played by the judiciary in New Zealand compared to jurisdictions where "higher 
law" gives courts greater scope to review issues of campaign funding and electoral legislation.1 
Despite this, the courts have historically played a role in shaping the nature of elections in New 
Zealand.2 This role has continued in a number of decisions in recent years. In particular, the 
  
  Submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington. Recipient of the 2010 
Robert Orr McGechan Prize. I would like to thank Dean Knight and Claudia Geiringer for their comments.  
1  Andrew Geddis "Regulation of Campaign Funding in New Zealand: Practices, Problems and Prospects for 
Change" in KD Ewing and S Issacharoff (eds) Party Funding and Campaign Financing in International 
Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006) 13 at 14. 
2  Jonathan Boston and others "Courting Change: The Role of the Judiciary in Altering an Electoral System" 
(1997) 4 PLR 229; S Corben "Financing Political Party Broadcasting" (1997) 8 Auckland U L Rev 265. 
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judiciary has played an important role in the application and development of electoral broadcasting 
law and electoral expression in New Zealand.  
The most recent addition to this small yet not insignificant pool of electoral decisions is the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Alliance Party v Electoral Commission (Alliance).3 The Alliance 
Party challenged the allocation of funding and free air time that it had received from the Electoral 
Commission preceding the 2008 General Election. In reaching its decision, the Court stated: 
"statutory language should be read, if reasonably possible, in a way which facilitates the important 
democratic feature of dissemination of election messages."4 The Court of Appeal's statement is of 
interest for both what it says and what it leaves unsaid in an area fraught with conceptual difficulties 
and competing philosophies.5  
The meaning of "election messages" is not self-evident, particularly whether a distinction exists 
between "electoral" expression and general political expression. There is a risk that any regulation 
of electoral expression through the control of broadcast access may infringe on rights of legitimate 
political expression. To avoid this, a conception of electoral expression must be defined to 
sufficiently separate it from other political expression. New Zealand's electoral broadcasting 
legislation and case law exhibit the demarcation of an "electoral institution", distinct from other 
general political activity, enabling the delineation of a distinct conception of electoral expression in 
New Zealand.  
I draw upon the work of scholars such as C Edwin Baker, Richard Briffault and Burt Neuborne 
who have contributed to the development of an "institutionally bounded" conception of elections 
and electoral expression, and in particular electoral broadcasting. An "institution" in this context 
refers to the rules, norms and practices that define a conception of elections as separate from other 
political spheres. The electoral "institution" comprises particular rules and bounds that operate in the 
context of an election, enabling a line (albeit a blurry one) to be drawn between electoral expression 
and political expression. This boundary is drawn on both the temporal and descriptive levels. I argue 
that New Zealand's electoral case law indicates increasing recognition that, at least implicitly, within 
the context of such institutional bounds, actors may be exposed to greater review by the courts and 
held to higher standards of conduct. This paper will focus on electoral broadcasting as a case study, 
but similar institutional bounds could be drawn for election advertising generally. Framing elections 
as subject to institution bounds can aid judges and counsel in framing issues in cases involving the 
balancing of rights during elections. 
  
3  Alliance Party v Electoral Commission [2010] NZAR 222 [Alliance Party (CA)]. 
4  Ibid, at [35]. 
5  Andrew Geddis "Three conceptions of the electoral moment" (2003) 28 AJLP 53 at 75. Geddis highlights 
the difficulties of many competing positions, noting at 75 that "some electoral practices and consequences 
that are unacceptable under one normative vision of the voting process will be considered not only tolerable, 
but even necessary, under another". 
 ELECTORAL EXPRESSION WITH INSTITUTIONAL BOUNDS 461 
II ELECTORAL BROADCASTING AND THE 2008 GENERAL 
ELECTION: ALLIANCE PARTY V ELECTORAL 
COMMISSION 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Alliance provides answers to a number of technical 
questions as to the application of the Broadcasting Act 1989 to political parties during an election 
campaign. In particular, it clarifies the requisite mechanism for the Electoral Commission 's 
allocation of airtime and funding to parties for broadcast advertising. More than that, the decision of 
the Court of Appeal raises further questions about the wider treatment of elections in New Zealand. 
Specifically, can electoral expression be defined as a distinct category of expression, separate from 
that which occurs during wider political discourse? 
A Facts and Procedural History 
Political parties' access to broadcast media for the purposes of electoral advertising is tightly 
regulated through Part 6 of the Broadcasting Act 1989 (the Act).6 The Act regulates broadcast 
access in two key ways. First, New Zealand's publically owned broadcasters, Television New 
Zealand (TVNZ) and Radio New Zealand (RNZ), are required to provide free time for the 
broadcasting of opening and closing addresses by political parties in the lead up to an election.7 
Broadcasters are required to have regard to the six factors mentioned in s 75 when providing time 
for these broadcasts.8 Secondly, the Act requires that public money be made available to the 
Electoral Commission (the Commission) to be allocated to parties to pay for the costs of election 
broadcast advertising.9 The allocation of public funds to parties is complemented by a prohibition 
on the spending of any other money to purchase election programmes.10  
  
6  Andrew Geddis Electoral Law in New Zealand: Practice and Policy (LexisNexis New Zealand, Wellington, 
2007) at 159–172.  
7  Broadcasting Act 1989, s 71(1). 
8  Ibid, s 71A(4). 
9  Ibid, s 74. The amount provided for the 2008 General Election was $2,855,000 excluding GST, or 
$3,211,875 including GST.  
10  Ibid, s 70(2)(b). There are other limited exceptions: s 70(2)(c) allows paid advertising in relation solely to a 
named constituency candidate. This may not be advertising for the candidate’s party and must not exceed 
the candidate’s campaign spending limit. Given the tight spending restrictions placed on individual 
candidates, this exception has little effect. Advertisements by the Electoral Commission and other named 
election officials are exempted as are non-partisan advertisements broadcast, as a community service, by the 
broadcaster (s 70(2)(c) and (d) respectively). Spending restrictions do not limit the funds a party may spend 
on the production of its electoral programmes and do not prevent the broadcast of election programmes in 
the form of news, comment or current affairs (ss 70(2A) and 70(3) respectively). A number of recent 
Electoral Commission decisions have clarified the news, comment or current affairs exception. A live 
broadcast of the Prime Minister’s election date announcement was a news programme (Electoral 
Commission decision 2008-41 (3 November 2008)) but a talkback radio show hosted by a number of MPs 
who made statements encouraging listeners to vote for their particular parties bore "none of the general 
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The Commission is charged with allocating this pool of time and money between eligible 
political parties in accordance with criteria specified in the Act.11 These allocations are made by the 
Commission having regard to six factors considered exhaustive by the Commission.12 They are: the 
number of votes the party and its candidates received at the previous election or any intermediate 
by-election; the party's current number of members of Parliament; any relationships that exist 
between parties; indications of public support from opinion polls and party membership; and the 
need to provide a fair opportunity for each party to convey its policies to the public by the 
broadcasting of election programmes on television. 
The Commission's allocation decision preceding the 2008 general election split funding into 
four bands:13 
(1) The major parliamentary political parties, Labour and National, each received $1,000,000, 
12 minutes for an opening address and six minutes for a closing address. 
(2) Parties holding four or more parliamentary seats – the Green Party, Māori Party and New 
Zealand First – were each allocated $240,000, eight minutes opening and three minutes 
closing. 
(3) Other parliamentary parties – the ACT Party, Progressive and United Future – were each 
allocated $100,000, four minutes opening and three minutes closing. 
(4) Non-parliamentary parties were each allocated $10,000, a production package worth over 
$7,000 and one minute for an opening address. These parties were not allocated time for a 
closing address. 
The Alliance Party, which had won only 0.07 per cent of the vote in the previous 2005 general 
election, and was not represented in Parliament, challenged the Commission's allocation by way of 
judicial review. Despite the challenge faltering in the High Court at first instance, the Court of 
Appeal ultimately upheld one of the two prongs of the Alliance's attack.  
B All About Time and Money: The Alliance Litigation 
The Alliance's first challenge was to the interpretation the Commission had applied to the Act 
both during the 2008 allocation process and during a number of previous elections. It was argued the 
  
indicators of a current affairs programme", so was in breach of the Act (Electoral Commission decision 
2008-34 (18 September 2008)). 
11  Ibid, s 75(1). 
12  Ibid, s 75(2). Regarding the exhaustiveness of the criteria see Electoral Commission Te Kaitiaki Take 
Kowhiri, on Allocation of Time and Money to Political Parties for Broadcasting of Election Programmes: 
2005 General Election (Electoral Commission, Wellington, 2005). 
13  See Alliance Party (CA), above n 3, at [24]. 
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Commission had erred in law by not allocating time for an opening and a closing address to the non-
parliamentary parties, contrary to the wording of s 73(1) of the Act, which reads: 
In respect of each election period, the Electoral Commission must allocate to political parties, in such 
proportions as the Electoral Commission considers appropriate, the time that TVNZ and RNZ have 
made available for opening addresses and closing addresses in accordance with section 71A. 
The Commission had interpreted the discretion given by the words "as the Electoral 
Commission considers appropriate" as being the operative words of the section.14 Given this 
discretion, it argued that the Commission was free to allocate time to parties as it saw fit, and 
importantly, that this phrase contemplated the Commission choosing to make a nil allocation of time 
to a particular party or "band" of parties. This submission found mixed favour in the decision of 
MacKenzie J in the High Court whose analysis focused on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(Bill of Rights Act). MacKenzie J did not accept that the Act, read in light of the Bill of Rights Act, 
contemplated that no allocation of time be made to a party, as this would offend freedom of 
expression.15 Despite finding that some allocation of time needed to be made, his Honour was 
willing to accept that the Act only contemplated that time needed to be allocated in one of four 
components (being a matrix of TVNZ/RNZ and opening/closing).16 Consequently, the 
Commission's decision to only allocate time for an opening address did not contravene the 
Broadcasting Act. 
On appeal by the Alliance, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the High Court. The 
Court of Appeal held that the proper reading of the section required the Commission to provide time 
for both an opening and a closing address. The Court found that this conclusion could be maintained 
on the face of the plain words of s 73(1) without need to resort to the Bill of Rights Act or 
instruments of statutory interpretation. However, Hammond J, writing for the Court, continued:17 
If there is any doubt about the meaning of the words, that meaning should be preferred which accords 
with the critical context of this allocation: that of a general election. Statutory language should be read, 
if reasonably possible, in a way which facilitates the important democratic feature of dissemination of 
election messages. 
This statement is a strong one; it requires that ambiguities be construed in a way that is most 
consistent with the right in question. It is certainly not consistent with the test currently favoured for 
the application of the Bill of Rights Act set out in R v Hansen, as that test first involves an inquiry 
  
14  Alliance Party v Electoral Commission HC Wellington CIV-2008-409-1253, 18 September 2008 at [12] 
[Alliance Party (HC)]. 
15  Ibid, at [11] 
16  Ibid, at [14]. 
17  Alliance Party (CA), above n 3, at [35]. 
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into justified limitations under s 5.18 Hammond J's statement bears a closer resemblance to Elias 
CJ's alternative test in R v Hansen which primarily focused on s 6 and rights consistency.19 
However, the statement looks most similar to the common law "principle of legality", a tool of 
statutory interpretation available to the courts to interpret legislation consistently with fundamental 
rights.20 Lord Hoffmann's classic formulation of the principle is that Parliament cannot override 
"fundamental rights" with general or ambiguous words and consequently the courts will presume 
that Parliament intended general words to be read consistently with fundamental rights.21 The 
application of Lord Hoffmann's principle in New Zealand has found support in a number of 
decisions of the New Zealand Supreme Court.22  
The Alliance's second head of attack in both the High Court and the Court of Appeal was that 
the Commission had failed to have regard to a mandatory consideration and had taken in account an 
irrelevant factor in the decision to allocate $10,000 to non-parliamentary parties. The basis of the 
Alliance's challenge drew upon the explanation accompanying the Commission's allocation 
decision, which stated "the minimum amount allocated reflects the cost of a basic radio advertising 
campaign for a month".23 The Alliance argued that this was an irrelevant consideration (the cost of a 
one month radio advertising campaign was not included on the exhaustive list provided in s 75(2)). 
Further, it argued that it evidenced a failure by the Commission to have regard to s 75(2)(f), a 
mandatory relevant consideration, which directs the Commission to consider the need to provide a 
fair opportunity for each political party to convey its policies to the public by the broadcasting of 
election programmes on television.  
The High Court refused the Alliance's application on the ground that it was feasible that parties 
could spend the money allocated on television advertising if they wished.24 The Court of Appeal 
also refused to uphold the Alliance's application. The statement by the Commission did not 
  
18  R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 per Tipping J. 
19  Ibid, at [15], per Elias CJ.  
20  For an analysis of the role of the "principle of legality" in New Zealand, see Claudia Geiringer "The 
Principle of Legality and the Bill of Rights Act: A Critical Examination of R v Hansen" (2008) 6 NZJPIL 
59. For an English perspective, see SH Bailey Cases, Materials and Commentary on Administrative Law 
(Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 2005) 251–270; Douglas E Edlin "From Ambiguity to Legality: The 
Future of English Judicial Review" (2004) 52 Am J Comp L 383. 
21  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 (HL) at 131. 
22  Cropp v A Judicial Committee [2008] NZSC 46, 3 NZLR 774 at [27]; R v Hansen, above n 18, at [13]. In 
Hansen, at [13] Elias CJ went further to suggest that legislative ambiguities may be unnecessary for the 
courts to prefer a rights consistent interpretation.  
23  This document was reproduced in full by the Court of Appeal, above n 3, at [26]. 
24  Alliance Party (HC), above n 14, at [23]. 
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"preclude the possibility that it had turned its mind to the cost of a television campaign".25 The 
Court considered the matter a moot point as the allocation had already taken place.26 Further, the 
Court expressed reluctance at intruding upon matters relating to the election of members of 
Parliament unless "absolutely necessary to determine lawfulness".27 However, this did not stop the 
Court warning the Commission that, in as much as the Commission had based its decision on the 
cost of a basic radio advertising campaign – which was the only consideration mentioned in its 
explanation – this would be in error.28 
C Implications of the Decision 
The unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal to partially overturn the decision of the High 
Court was a muted victory for the Alliance, the 2008 election already having taken place. However, 
the Court's obiter dicta can be seen as a stern warning for those involved in electoral broadcasting. 
The Court expressed sympathy for the Commission, noting the difficulty it faced having to allocate 
the 30 minutes of time provided for closing addresses between 18 qualifying parties.29 This led the 
Court to suggest that there was a strong argument that TVNZ's allocation had been in breach of the 
Act by failing to provide sufficient time given the number of qualifying parties.30 The Court 
suggested that this might have been a breach of s 71A.31 This section requires the broadcasters to 
consider the s 75 criteria when making their proposals on the provision of free airtime.32 By not 
providing sufficient time for both an opening and a closing address TVNZ may have failed to 
consider s 75(2)(f) which required a fair opportunity for each party to convey its policies to the 
public by the broadcasting of election programmes on television.  
Arguably, this breach could have also been in regard of s 71. Broadcasters are required, under 
Section 71A, to provide statements and proposals of available time to the Commission, whereas s 
71(1) requires that such an allocation actually be made. In light of this decision the words of s 71(1) 
could arguably be read as: 
  
25  Alliance Party (CA), above n 3, at [43]. 
26  Furthermore, the 2008 election had already taken place, the Alliance Party winning 0.08 per cent of the 
vote. 
27  Alliance Party (CA), above n 3, at [43].  
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid, at [34]. 
30  Ibid.  
31  Ibid. 
32  Broadcasting Act 1989, s 71A(4). 
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TVNZ and RNZ must each provide [sufficient] time, free of charge, for the broadcasting, in an election 
period, of the opening addresses and closing addresses of political parties.  
A number of issues are raised by the Court of Appeal's decision, particularly for those 
organisations, like the Electoral Commission and public broadcasters, involved in apportioning 
broadcast access during elections. The Electoral Commission in particular will have to make 
alterations to the allocations methodology that has been used in previous elections.33 TVNZ may 
also have to work more closely with the Commission before it makes a provision of time available, 
to ensure that it provides sufficient free time that an opening and closing address can be allocated to 
all eligible parties. If this does not occur, there may be future challenges by parties not only against 
the Commission but also, in light of the Court's decision, against TVNZ. Finally, the Commission 
will need to ensure that its reasons for allocation are both fully stated and consistent with the criteria 
established in the Act. 
III ELECTIONS, EXPRESSION AND "INSTITUTIONAL 
BOUNDS" 
Looking beyond the decision in Alliance, what is to be made of the Court of Appeal's statement 
that "statutory language should be read, if reasonably possible, in a way which facilitates the 
important democratic feature of dissemination of election messages"?34 It is important to distil the 
meaning of "election message". In particular, is there something about elections and electoral 
expression that sets it apart from the wider political sphere?  
A category of electoral expression can be delineated using "institutional bounds" which frame 
the extent and nature of expression in the context of an election. To define these bounds I examine a 
model of elections and electoral expression developed by three leading First Amendment scholars: 
C Edwin Baker, Richard Briffault and Burt Neuborne.35 This model holds that a number of features 
of elections, and associated expression, are governed by particular rules and norms. I then examine a 
line of New Zealand cases, most relating to the judicial review of broadcasters during elections, to 
show that this model has been implicitly recognised in the New Zealand courts. The judiciary, as 
  
33  Allocations of a single minute for an opening address and no closing address had also been made under 
fundamentally the same statutory scheme preceding the 2005 election. 
34  Alliance Party (CA), above n 3, at [35]. 
35  C Edwin Baker "Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech" (1998) 33 Harv CR-CL L Rev 1; Richard 
Briffault "Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Election/Politics Line" (1999) 77 Tex L Rev 1751; Burt 
Neuborne "The Supreme Court and Free Speech: Love and a Question" (1998) 42 St Louis U L J 791. For a 
critical analysis of these authors’ models, see Lillian R BeVier "The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An 
Economic, Political, and Constitutional Analysis" (1999) 85 Va L Rev 1761. BeVier argues that the 
institutionally bounded conception of elections has developed in response to the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Buckley v Valero 424 US 1 (1976) but despite this, the model and dichotomy posed by the 
institutional model (namely that electoral spending/speech can be distinguished from political 
spending/speech) is not supported by the decision in Buckley v Valero. 
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ultimate overseers of the electoral process, have an important role to play in defining the extent and 
bounds of electoral expression.36 I argue that framing the balancing of rights at election time in 
terms of institutional bounds can aid both counsel and the courts. 
A Electoral Expression with "Institutional Bounds" 
The use and meaning of the term "institution" in this context requires elaboration. Often 
"institution" is treated as synonymous with "organisation". However, in this article I use 
"institution" in its wider, technical meaning that is more frequently attributed to it in economic, 
political and sociological theory. North's seminal definition of institutions defines them as "the rules 
of the game in a society or, more formally, the human devised constraints that shape human 
interaction".37 An institution comprises "the conventions, norms and formally sanctioned rules of a 
society".38 Institutions govern behaviour, structure society and enable social cooperation, 
coordination and interaction.39 A conception of an election as an institution comprises particular 
rules, norms and principles governing elections and constrains the expression that occurs within. 
The Bill of Rights Act guarantees a wide right of freedom of expression, providing that 
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and 
impart information and opinions of any kind in any form".40 The application of the right of freedom 
of expression recognised in the Bill of Rights Act is constrained, however, by such reasonable limits 
"as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".41 Jurists have posited a number 
of different forms of expression encompassed in "freedom of expression", including political, 
cultural, commercial and artistic expression.42 Political expression is often singled out from these 
categories as the type of expression most deserving of protection, and the least appropriate for 
  
36  Boston and others, above n 2, at 231. 
37  Douglass C North Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1990) at 3. 
38  Arild Vatn Institutions and the Environment (Edward Elgar Publishing Inc, Northampton, 2005) at 60. 
39   Maria Minniti and Moran Lévesque "Recent Developments in the Economics of Entrepreneurship" (2008) 
23 Journal of Business Venturing 603 at 608. Indeed, given the potential for definitional confusion 
"institution" may not be the most appropriate term to describe the rules and norms governing elections. 
However, due to the prevalence of the term in the relevant literature I have continued to employ it here. 
40  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
41  Ibid, s 5. For commentary on the application of the Bill of Rights Act, see generally A Butler and P Butler 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: a commentary (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005); P Rishworth and others 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2003).  
42  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] AC 457 at [148]; Müller and others v Switzerland (1991) 13 
EHRR 212 (ECHR). 
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regulation.43 The sanctity with which political expression is regarded is, of course, not without 
cause. The ability to criticise elected officials, protest against their decisions and to engage in 
political discourse are fundamental to a healthy democracy.44 This is all the more important where a 
constitution is founded upon a sovereign Parliament; free political expression becomes a key 
mechanism for political accountability.  
Expression seen in the "pre-election period" bears many similarities to healthy political 
expression.45 It involves criticism of government policy, the accountability of incumbent 
representatives, and the presentation of alternative ideas, philosophies and policies. Notwithstanding 
this, there is something different about electoral expression. In the lead up to elections, states across 
the Western world regulate expression, quietening the voices of some and enhancing the 
amplification of others in a way that rarely occurs in other political contexts.46 However, there is a 
risk that without a sufficiently defined concept of "electoral expression" or "election messages" 
policies designed to regulate electoral expression may encroach on other expression, particularly 
wider political discourse.47  
The exceptionality of elections and electoral expression touches on the very legitimacy of 
democracy and democratic institutions.48 The rules, practices and norms that make up the institution 
of public decision making, combined with a wider, non-election-centred view of politics,49 enable 
an election to be viewed as a "distinct institutional moment".50 An election, Baker argues, should be 
regarded as a legally structured governing institution.51 It is from an institutional conception of 
elections that an "institutionally bounded" definition of electoral expression can be established. In 
other words, expression can be constrained within the bounds of rules and norms comprising the 
  
43  Campbell v MGN Ltd, ibid, at [148]. Baroness Hale stated at [148] that "there are undoubtedly different 
types of speech, just as there are different types of private information, some of which are more deserving of 
protection in a democratic society than others. Top of the list is political speech." 
44  Bowman v United Kingdom (1998) 26 EHRR 1 (ECHR) at 16–18. 
45  Briffault, above n 35, at 1753. 
46  KD Ewing and S Issacharoff "Introduction" in KD Ewing and S Issacharoff (eds) Party Funding and 
Campaign Financing in International Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006) 1 at 6. 
47  Neuborne, above n 35, at 810. Neuborne notes "undue censorship" as a key potential obstacle to an 
institutional model. This undue censorship could be caused by either a misconceptualised electoral 
institution or through further extension of the constraints of institutionally bound expression into other areas 
of society. Ultimately however, Neuborne is comfortable that the significant difference between the special 
nature of elections and the rest of society generally means the risk on undue restriction is limited.  
48  Geddis, above n 5 at 54. 
49  Baker, above n 35, at 34. 
50  Geddis, above n 5, at 60. 
51  Baker, above n 35, at 24 and 25. 
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"institution" of elections to ensure its optimal operation.52 Electoral expression can then be seen as a 
narrower subcategory of political expression, serving a particular limited purpose within the 
functioning of a democratic state – specifically, within the electoral institution.53  
That expression can have institutional bounds is not, of itself, exceptional. There are many 
instances where expression is categorised and institutionally bounded because of its content or the 
time, place or nature of the expression.54 Indeed, even political expression is frequently allowed to 
be bounded within the context of particular institutions.55 By enabling the identification of a distinct 
category of "electoral expression", an institutional view of elections inevitably allows for the 
possibility of state or judicial intervention or regulation in the way expression occurs within the 
institution and the rules and norms that comprise it. Indeed, electoral campaigns are already subject 
to many regulations not found in other spheres.56  
Baker takes a process-orientated view of the electoral system, arguing that it can be regulated to 
enhance the "democratic nature of the process".57 Elections serve as the mechanism by which 
political opinion, created mostly by general political expression, is transformed into political 
power.58 This is important. Where there is the possibility for state intervention in the institution, it 
should be limited to enhancing the democratic nature of the electoral institution.59 
  
52  Neuborne, above n 35, at 801. 
53  Baker, above n 35, at 26.  
54  Thomas Scanlon "A Theory of Freedom of Expression" (1972) 1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 204 at 209; 
H J McCloskey "Limits to Freedom of Expression" (1982) 16 Journal of Value Inquiry 47; C Edwin Baker 
"Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place and Manner Regulations" (1983–
1984) 78 Nw U L Rev 937; William J Brennan "The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of 
the First Amendment" (1965) 79 Harv L Rev 1 at 13; W Sadurski Freedom of Speech and Its Limits 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 2001). 
55   Some examples of institutionally bounded regulation of political expression are given by Baker, above n 35, 
at 21. These include the regulation of speeches or debates in Congress or Parliament (such as the length of a 
speech); regulation of the questions that can be asked, and the nature of the answers that may be given in 
court and limits on what government officials can say about government policy. Other examples may 
include non-legal institutional rules like the principle of unanimity found within the convention of Cabinet 
collective responsibility. Neuborne, above n 35, also gives union elections and commercial capital markets 
as yet more examples of bounded institutions.  
56  Jacob Rowbottom "The Case against Political Advertising on the Broadcast Media" in KD Ewing and S 
Issacharoff (eds) Party Funding and Campaign Financing in International Perspective (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2006) 77 at 82. 
57  Baker, above n 35, at 26. 
58  Ibid, at 28. 
59  Courts in the United States have been willing to allow regulations that enhance communications so long as 
they remain within the boundaries of that form of discourse. Where a regulation infringes on an established 
form of discourse courts have been far more likely to deem the regulation unconstitutional. See Daniel 
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To illustrate that elections can and are seen as an institution, Baker engages in an examination of 
American case law. The United States Supreme Court has found that exclusion of a racial group 
from an election, even during the height of segregation, is unconstitutional discrimination.60 The 
Court has held that parties themselves may be regulated regarding their access to the ballot,61 and 
that a ban on campaigning within 100 feet of a polling station on election day was not 
unconstitutional despite limiting core political expression.62 Further, in two separate decisions the 
courts have upheld a candidate's right to access broadcasting resources in the campaign period.63 
Finally, the Court has also upheld restrictions on corporate electoral expression, although this has 
since been overruled.64 These conclusions are consistent with these issues being seen as part of an 
institutionally bounded electoral process.65 The dictum in the aforementioned authorities leads 
Baker to conclude that:66  
[t]he Court can hardly stop short of the conclusion that the electoral context permits speech limitations 
that would not be permissible elsewhere … [the cases mentioned] implicitly accept the view that 
campaign speech is part of a legally structured, institutional realm in which speech can be regulated. 
A competing argument is that election campaigns heighten the importance of debate and opinion 
formation and thus should be free from regulation, to enable opportunities for discussion to come 
about "from the play of market forces".67 However, Baker argues that voters' opinions are formed in 
the wider political sphere (within which political expression is free) and that the focus of campaigns 
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is essentially an "employment" decision, requiring voters to use the opinions they have developed to 
select their preferred candidates.68  
Briffault acknowledges the procedural aspects of the electoral institution in transforming voice 
into governance, but he rejects Baker's claim that political opinions are predominantly formed 
before the electoral period. Rather, voters need to be able to put forward and consider alternative 
electoral choices. Briffault argues that communications can be considered to fall within the electoral 
institution if there is some possibility that it could affect the outcome of an election.69 Such 
communications can then be regulated, having regard to fundamental democratic values including 
"political equality, openness to participation, informed deliberation, and structured choice".70 
However, Briffault does not expand on how likely, or how significant, such an influence must be. 
Neuborne suggests that electoral expression may be distinguishable through a temporal and 
descriptive definition, even if these are essentially arbitrary.71 
The combined approach of Briffault and Neuborne provides a good characterisation of 
expression in the electoral institution. Briffault's criterion, while too wide to be useful without 
elaboration, provides a useful starting point for where, substantively, the boundaries of the 
institution are to be drawn. Complementing this, Neuborne provides guidance on how these 
boundaries are to operate in practice. Neuborne's illustration is a sound starting point:72 
Speech by a candidate, or speech by others [descriptive] within 90 days of an election [temporal] that 
mentions a candidate in a manner clearly calculated to support or oppose her election [descriptive].  
There must be some modifications to this definition. Expression "mentioning" a candidate is too 
narrow as this excludes obvious inferences and even opaque references that would have the same 
effect in substance. A broader definition may encompass references made in relation to a candidate, 
as understood by an ordinary citizen. Limiting the definition to a candidate is also too narrow, 
especially in countries where elections are primarily contested along party lines. The temporal 
element is necessarily arbitrary, but important, as this provides the most concrete outer limit of the 
expression occurring within the electoral institution. Setting this temporal limit at 90 days may 
encroach too much on healthy political expression; where this temporal limit is to be set is a 
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substantive judgment to be made by a particular society. Given these modifications, a refined 
definition of electoral expression could provide: 
Expression by a candidate or expression by others within [x] days of an election that makes reference to 
a party or candidate, as understood by an ordinary citizen, in a manner clearly calculated to support or 
oppose the election of that party or candidate. 
Having described a broad model of institutionally bounded elections, the question remains, is a 
similar conception of an electoral institution recognised in New Zealand? I next examine a series of 
New Zealand decisions that support the idea that electoral expression and behaviour, as scrutinised 
by the judiciary, can be viewed as part of a distinct institution. 
B Is Electoral Broadcasting in New Zealand Institutionally Bounded? 
An analysis of New Zealand's electoral broadcasting legislation and case law shows that the 
treatment of expression, at least expression through the medium of broadcast advertising, during 
election periods is broadly consistent with the aforementioned institutionally bounded conception of 
electoral expression. A recent line of cases dealing primarily with broadcasters' actions during 
elections supports the proposition that the New Zealand judiciary conceives of elections, and the 
expression that occurs within them, as something special and distinct from the general political 
environment. In particular, the judiciary has found a greater willingness to scrutinise expression 
occurring within an electoral context where judicial restraint would otherwise be expected. The 
judiciary has consciously held those participating within the electoral broadcasting arena to a higher 
standard than if they were engaging in other political activities, requiring such actors to uphold 
democratic responsibilities, even if they are operating as a private enterprise.  
Elections in New Zealand take the form of a special institution with election campaigns forming 
"a central part of the process of structured choice and democratic deliberation that constitutes an 
election".73 The recognition in New Zealand's judicial decisions of an institutional conception of 
elections leads to the identification of an institutionally bounded realm of election expression, 
separate from other political expression. In contrast to Baker's model, it does not seem that the New 
Zealand electoral institution, at least since the advent of proportional representation, is limited to 
mere process or selection of candidates. Indeed, what is said during this pre-election period appears 
to be important to voters' opinion formation.74 This adds even more weight to the argument that an 
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74  Dunne v CanWest TVWorks Ltd [2005] NZAR 577 (HC) at [10] and [13] [Dunne]. Consider the evidence of 
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election ought to be conceptualised as a special institution entailing its own rules, responsibilities 
and a heightened level of judicial scrutiny.75  
C The Legislative Framework of Elections and Electoral Bodies 
The first indications of the special rules comprising New Zealand's electoral institution are 
found in statute. The Broadcasting Act 1989 defines a class of "election programmes",76 and 
regulates who may create, purchase and broadcast such programmes.77 The High Court has noted 
that during an election "the Broadcasting Act makes it clear that broadcasters are not free to do as 
they choose", noting the tight legislative institutional framework governing how expression occurs 
through the broadcast media during an election.78   
These strong institutional bounds give the State alone power to apportion direct broadcast access 
for political parties.79 The body through which the State manages elections and allocates broadcast 
access is the Electoral Commission. The Commission is an independent Crown entity and this 
independence is fundamental to the electoral institution.80 The Court of Appeal has recognised that 
the Electoral Act 1993 gives the Commission a "significant" and "special" status.81 This status 
derives from it holding "a key position and serves a number of vital functions in the operation of the 
nation's electoral system".82 Members of the Commission, like the judiciary, are protected from 
removal.83 Private industry boards, like the Advertising Standards Complaints Board, are subsidiary 
to the Commission on matters relating to an election.84 The statutory provisions defining the nature, 
membership and powers of the Electoral Commission highlight the weight given to the electoral 
institution and its key organs in New Zealand. 
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The Broadcasting Act contains a legislative definition of "election period".85 General elections 
in New Zealand are founded on a legislative framework.86 Elections must be held within no more 
than three years.87 As Issacharoff notes, parliamentary democracies have a natural election period, 
"beginning with the calling of elections and ending with the elections themselves", creating a 
readymade institutional boundary.88 Indeed, so important is the electoral institution that a number of 
provisions are "entrenched".89 Such a reconstitution of Parliament's powers highlights the treatment 
of elections as special institutions, related yet separate from the ordinary realm of political activity.  
D Judicial Perceptions of the Electoral Institution 
The judiciary's treatment of electoral broadcasting also evidences the recognition of an 
institutionally bounded conception of electoral expression. There are two key themes present in 
these decisions. First, actors within the electoral institution are more open to judicial scrutiny. 
Indeed, it would appear from some authorities that almost any actor participating in the electoral 
arena, at least within a public forum, may fall subject to enhanced scrutiny. On the other hand, a 
number of decisions in this area have been cautious and have seen courts unwilling to overstep their 
conventional role in the democratic process. Secondly, the courts have actively required higher 
standards of conduct from those participating in the electoral institution, relative to other political 
activity. These two themes represent judicially imposed constraints and responsibilities on those 
wishing to exercise expression in the electoral arena. As noted above, the focus of these case studies 
will be on electoral broadcasting. However, the themes discussed are also applicable to general 
electoral advertising. 
1 Greater exposure to review 
The comparative willingness of the judiciary to scrutinise particular activities can indicate both 
whether the courts consider elections to form a special institution (compared to other, more general, 
political activities) and, if such an institution does exist, what its extent is. The courts have typically 
shied away from intruding into political expression and have recognised that editorial decisions of 
the media generally ought to receive sufficient freedom.90 This is particularly so in political matters 
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where the media forms part of a public accountability mechanism for elected officials. However, a 
number of decisions illustrate that the courts treat their scrutinising role in elections as different than 
during ordinary political discourse. The context of an election may be an "exceptional and 
compelling" one,91 where judicial intervention is necessary.  
This scrutiny has transcended the "public/private divide" and has seen the courts entering 
controversial new territory. In Dunne v CanWest TVWorks Ltd (Dunne), Ronald Young J in the 
High Court held that TV3, a private television company, by virtue of its decision to host a pre-
election leaders' debate, was both amenable to judicial review and consequently subject to general 
public law obligations and responsibilities.92 TV3 had initially selected only the six most popular 
party leaders based on a recent poll. The plaintiffs were leaders of the two parliamentary parties that 
had been omitted from the debate and argued that TV3's selection criteria was flawed as the polling 
difference between a number of parties was within the poll's margin of error. By choosing to hold 
the pre-election leaders debate TV3 had put itself "into the public arena", creating a significant 
possibility of influencing the outcome of the election.93 In an earlier decision, TV3 Network Services 
v The Prime Minister (Rt Hon Helen Clark), Ronald Young J had held that a pre-election interview 
of the Prime Minister, again conducted by TV3, should be judicially scrutinised as it occurred at 
"the most sensitive time possible, during an election campaign".94 Again, the justification centred on 
the potential effect of the interview on both the outcome of the election and possible government 
formation.95 These statements bear a striking similarity to Briffault's conception of electoral 
expression as that which may affect the outcome on an election and suggest the recognition, and 
also share similarities with the definition of electoral expression suggested above. 
Elections operate in a "critical context"96 and this context alone can be used to determine the 
nature and extent of the electoral institution. Dunne highlights the importance of broadcasting 
during election periods, particularly in the manner in which the Court effectively distinguished 
electoral activity from other political discourse. What would undoubtedly have been an 
uncomfortable intrusion by the Court at any other time became the subject of judicial review within 
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the institutional context of an election.97 Had the facts of Dunne occurred in the days after an 
election it seems unlikely that the Court would have found the same comfort, or need, in scrutinising 
a private broadcaster in this regard, especially its production decisions.  
The distinction seen in Dunne between expression occurring within the electoral institution and 
general political discourse is highlighted by comparison to the decision of the High Court in 
Ransfield v Radio Network Ltd (Ransfield).98 In Ransfield, the plaintiffs were actively involved in 
debate on tenancy and Māori issues.99 The plaintiffs had been banned by the Radio Network from 
participating in a talkback radio programme and sought relief under both the Broadcasting Act and 
the Bill of Rights Act.100 After finding that no cause of action lay under the Broadcasting Act, 
Randerson J identified the importance of free political expression and implicitly accepted, at least 
for the purposes of the interlocutory proceeding, that the plaintiffs were exercising political 
expression.101 However, Randerson J found that the Radio Network's provision of talkback radio, 
while performing an important public role in enabling the exercising of expression,102 was not 
sufficient to displace the reality that the Radio Network was performing a private commercial 
operation for the profit of its shareholders. Thus they were not bound by the Bill of Rights Act and 
the Court would not intervene.103 Ransfield and Dunne sit uncomfortably unless viewed in the 
context of the electoral institution. While both the Radio Network and TV3 were private 
broadcasters making decisions to best enhance their profitability, TV3 had chosen to directly 
participate in the electoral institution. Viewed in this way, the cases again suggest that there is 
something special about the judiciary's perception of expression within the electoral institution that 
makes state intervention more appropriate than during ordinary political discourse. 
The heightened willingness of the courts to review expression and activity falling within the 
electoral institution, as in Dunne, has not been universally supported. In Alliance, the Court of 
Appeal went so far as to say that "[i]n matters relating to the election of Members of Parliament, this 
Court should not intrude any further than is absolutely necessary to determine lawfulness."104 This 
comment came in the context of the Court's decision to reject an application to inquire into an 
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allegation that the Electoral Commission had factored irrelevant considerations into its allocation of 
electoral advertising funds, a matter the Court considered moot. Given this, the wider applicability 
of the Court's statement is not clear. The statement may either be seen as a call for greater judicial 
restraint, contrary to Dunne, or instead a mere recognition of the need for judicial pragmatism. It is 
also unclear that the qualifier absolutely adds to the statement; either it is necessary for the court to 
determine lawfulness or it is not. In the context of the decision, the statement is most likely a call for 
pragmatism – the courts should not intervene simply for the sake of intervention if it is unlikely to 
have any meaningful effect. 
Another case posing difficulties for the decision in Dunne is Mangu v Television New Zealand 
Ltd (Mangu).105 The plaintiff, a candidate in an electorate, sought to challenge the broadcasting of a 
television news item on the contest for the electorate seat she was standing in on the basis that it had 
failed to mention her campaign. The news item instead focused on the two best performing 
candidates according to a recent poll. Lang J held that, in this case, TVNZ was not amenable to 
judicial review, nor was it performing a public function suitable to engage the Bill of Rights Act.106 
Lang J emphasised the freedom of editorial expression, whereas Ronald Young J strongly sought to 
uphold the right of voters to be informed.107 
Interestingly, Mangu was heard very shortly after the decision in Dunne was released, but 
despite the facts appearing to share many similarities, Lang J distinguished Dunne. His Honour 
accepted that both counsel had submitted that the facts of Mangu were "quite different" to those in 
Dunne and that the principles set out by Ronald Young J were not of assistance, but no detailed 
reasoning for this decision was given.108 It is far from obvious how the two cases are so sufficiently 
different that Dunne could be distinguished without further reason. Arguably, Mangu's claim was at 
least as strong as that of the plaintiffs in Dunne.109  
Mangu could be seen as representing the outer limits of the electoral institution in New Zealand. 
While the courts may be willing to intervene in programmes specifically designed for the airing of 
political views by candidates, they may allow greater deference to editorial discretion of the media 
in non-partisan news items of a merely informative nature. Indeed, it would arguably be hard to 
conceptualise the information generated by such a news item as an "electoral message", especially 
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when compared to a party leaders' debate as in Dunne.110 However, the Court in Mangu appears to 
have overlooked the key question – did the news item fall within the electoral institution? One of 
Mangu's key concerns was that the failure to include comment on her candidacy in the report 
diminished both her visibility and prejudiced her campaign by making it appear that she lacked 
"tangible support".111 Applying Briffault's criterion of whether the expression may affect the 
outcome of an election, a proposition similar to those posed in Dunne and TV3 Network Services v 
Prime Minister (Rt Hon Helen Clark), Mangu's case would seem to be one warranting similar 
judicial scrutiny. Indeed, Ronald Young J noted in Dunne that one of the key features of TV3's 
leaders debate which made it open to judicial scrutiny and created its public law obligations was that 
the programme, at least in part, assisted "all voters to inform themselves of the leaders and the 
policies of the political parties contesting the election".112 It could surely also be said that at least 
part of the purpose of a television news item covering the contest for a particular electorate is to 
inform voters of which candidates are standing.  
In any case, the haste of the interlocutory proceedings combined with the concession of Mangu's 
counsel that TVNZ had the right to place the emphasis in the programme on the two best polling 
candidates meant that the opportunity of the court to address the nature of electoral expression was 
insubstantial.113 Another argument may be that Mangu is a case where counsel and judge alike 
failed to appropriately frame the expression in question. Lang J noted that:114 
Mr Illingworth [counsel for Mangu] frankly conceded that, if his argument was correct, every decision 
made by TVNZ in relation to the content and presentation of its news programmes, and One News in 
particular, would potentially be subject to judicial review. 
In my view, this issue could have been overcome by framing the news item as part of the 
electoral institution. Rather than conceding that all of TVNZ's editorial decisions were potentially 
subject to review, counsel for Mangu could have argued that judicial scrutiny attaches to the fact 
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that the programme occurred within the electoral institution.115 This would have greatly limited the 
number and type of news programmes that could have been subject to judicial scrutiny, in the same 
way as it was not suggested in Dunne that every debate or programme TV3 screened would be 
potentially subject to judicial review. An argument for a narrower threshold of judicial scrutiny in 
this instance may well have proven more palatable to the Court.  
Goulden v Wellington City Council may be seen as a failure of the Court to appropriately 
consider the electoral institution. The plaintiff, a sitting councillor and a mayoral candidate, 
reviewed his censure by the Council after it found he had breached the Council's Code of 
Conduct.116 The Code of Conduct required councillors to avoid criticising any employee of the 
Council (including the Chief Financial Officer).117 In the course of his campaign, Goulden placed 
an advertisement in a local newspaper criticising the spending activities of the Mayor and the 
Council's Chief Financial Officer.118 While the case turned on the procedures followed by the 
Council in reprimanding Goulden, little was made of the context of the advertisement itself, namely 
that it was published as part of Goulden's electoral campaign. The concept of an electoral institution 
and electoral expression is not just an expression restricting concept; it can be used to justify judicial 
recognition of freedom of expression where it would otherwise be restricted. Given that the Code of 
Conduct did not create an absolute prohibition against councillors criticising employees, this was a 
case where it may have been appropriate for the Court to have found that within the electoral 
institution more leeway ought to be given to candidates in the course of their campaigns.  
An interesting application of the public/private divide during elections, albeit outside the context 
of broadcasting, has come in a number of decisions on internal candidate selection in political 
parties. In Peters v Collinge the Court held that political parties were legally "private bodies" subject 
to private law and their own internal rules.119 Consequentially, parties were free to select candidates 
as they wished. However, this position softened in the later decision of the High Court in Payne v 
New Zealand National Party.120 Given the fundamental importance of political parties to the 
electoral institution, the focus on parties as private entities may appear contrary to the recognition of 
such an institution. However, it may instead be seen to aid the drawing of boundaries – when parties 
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act in public, such as leaders debates and advertising, they are undoubtedly acting within the 
electoral institution – but when they act internally, even when selecting a candidate for an election, 
they are making a decision in a purely political sphere, separate from the electoral institution. 
2 Higher standards of conduct required curing an election campaign 
In concert with increased exposure to judicial scrutiny within the electoral institution, the courts 
have also recognised that actors in this context will be subject to higher standards of conduct. This 
again highlights a delineation of an institutionalised model of elections and electoral expression. 
Conduct that may be acceptable in the context of ordinary political discourse may fail to reach the 
heightened standards created by principles of fairness and democracy during an election campaign. 
The "sensitive time" that exists during an election has been found to create public 
responsibilities of fairness and balance upon broadcasters, even private broadcasters.121 These 
responsibilities sit in addition to the broadcasting standards and Broadcasting Act requirements 
otherwise present. The nature of these additional standards of fairness and balance are particular to 
the electoral context. Again, this serves to suggest the existence of a special "electoral institution".  
Broadcasters participating in an electoral context are required to act with "scrupulous 
impartiality".122 A forceful interview conducted with the Prime Minister during an election 
campaign relating to allegations of a cover-up made over a release of genetically modified corn did 
not, of itself, necessarily breach any broadcasting standards.123 However, the fact that the interview 
occurred during an election campaign – "the most sensitive time possible" – required a similarly 
forceful challenge to the accuser to maintain impartiality.124 Whether a standard was breached by 
the interview treating the accuser less forcefully would depend on context. Here, the context of an 
election campaign "clearly required forceful challenge of both accuser and accused".125 Further, it 
was noted by the Court that "a breach of the standards of balance, impartiality and fairness in a 
programme as significant as this (given it was broadcast during an election campaign) was a serious 
lapse by the broadcaster".126 
Similar heightened standards have also been recognised by the courts in the interpretation of 
legislation. In Alliance, discussed above, the Court noted that the purpose of the tight regulation of 
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election broadcasting in New Zealand must be "the democratic principle of fairness of access".127 
Despite finding that a misinterpretation had occurred on the ordinary words of the Act, without the 
need to resort to tools of statutory construction, the Court suggested in obiter that "statutory 
language should be read, if reasonably possible, in a way which facilitates the important democratic 
feature of dissemination of election messages".128 As noted earlier, this statement is phrased 
consistently with the so-called "principle of legality", that, in the words of Lord Hoffmann:129 
In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume 
that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.  
 The comments of the Court of Appeal recognise a distinct electoral institution in New Zealand 
encompassing, at the very least, its own institutional rights and principles regarding broadcasting 
access. It is not clear why the Court of Appeal chose the words "election messages" when it could 
have referred to "electoral programmes", as defined in the Broadcasting Act. This may indicate an 
attempt by the Court to allude to a wider principle, potentially one applicable to the wider electoral 
institution. 
The comments of the Court of Appeal in Alliance are reminiscent of Ronald Young J's 
statements in Dunne. His Honour noted that a variable intensity of judicial review had been applied 
in New Zealand – where fundamental rights were in play, the standard of arbitrariness required "will 
not be high".130 Here, the Judge considered that citizens had a fundamental right "to be as well 
informed as possible before exercising their right to vote".131 TV3's decision to include some parties 
within the poll's error rate but exclude others was sufficiently arbitrary in the context of an election 
to be deemed unreasonable by the Court.132 Again, the Court has recognised a higher standard of 
conduct exists within the electoral context.  
Interestingly, a similar challenge to that in Dunne had previously arisen before the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority in 2002.133 There, the Authority had held that TVNZ's decision to exclude a 
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non-parliamentary party from its "minor leaders debate", despite polling similarly to parliamentary 
parties that had been included, was within TVNZ's editorial discretion and had not breached 
standards. The Authority stated that to find a breach in this case would be contrary to the Bill of 
Rights Act. The Authority's decision has been criticised for undervaluing political expression and 
failing to recognise the "heightened importance of the balance standard in the circumstances" within 
the context of an election campaign.134 
The preceding paragraphs identify an electoral institution in New Zealand. Where matters fall 
within the institution, the courts have shown a greater willingness to scrutinise activity and hold 
participants to a higher standard of conduct. These features represent the bounds of electoral 
expression and enable a distinct category to be identified. The recognition of a defined electoral 
institution can aid courts to decide whether the expression in question is electoral or whether it is 
general political express and enables a divergence of rules between these two spheres as appropriate.  
E Whose Institution is it? 
More must be said about just who "owns" the institution, that is, for whom does it exist to serve? 
Parties have a great interest in the dissemination of election messages, namely their freedom to 
impart such messages. Indeed, it is the rights of political parties and candidates that dominate 
jurisprudence on electoral expression.135 In my view, this is an unfortunately narrow consideration 
of the rights and interests involved in the dissemination of electoral messages. It risks marginalising 
the interests of key electoral stakeholders – voters. 
Voters hold the key interest in the electoral institution. The dissemination of electoral messages 
is meaningless without the ability for voters to receive or seek it. The right of voters to receive 
information, especially at a low cost to them, is fundamental to ensuring effective participation. The 
right to vote is not complete if voters lack the ability to use their right without being as informed as 
possible (or at least as informed as they wish to be).136 An electoral choice is not a true choice if 
  
broadcaster who was clearly amenable to review and there were no grounds on which to argue the BBC’s 
decision was unreasonable. See Petition of Scottish National Party and Others for Judicial Review [2010] 
CSOH 56. 
134  Claudia Geiringer and Steven Price "Moving from Self-justification to Demonstrable Justification – the Bill 
of Rights and the Broadcasting Standards Authority" in Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd (eds) Law, Liberty, 
Legislation: Essays in Honour of John Burrows QC (LexisNexis NZ Ltd, Wellington, 2008) 295 at 329. 
135  For a range of perspectives see generally Janet L Hiebert "Elections, Democracy and Free Speech: More at 
Stake than an Unfettered Right to Advertise" in K D Ewing and S Issacharoff (eds) Party Funding and 
Campaign Financing in International Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006) 269; Bradley A Smith 
"Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform" (1996) 105 Yale L J 
1049; Samual Issacharoff and Pamela S Karlan "Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform" (1998–1999) 77 
Tex L Rev 1705. 
136  Roach v Electoral Commissioner [2007] HCA 43 at [85] per Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ. Further, in 
Dunne, above n 74, at [43], Ronald Young J argued that there is a "fundamental right of citizens in a 
 ELECTORAL EXPRESSION WITH INSTITUTIONAL BOUNDS 483 
voters lack an opportunity to become aware of alternatives.137 To this end, the electoral institution 
can be used to enhance the interests of voters by enabling them to be exposed to a breadth of 
electoral information and information. Indeed, this may go further to include facilitation of third 
party electoral discourse, but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.138 The use of broadcast 
advertising is an important basis for discussing the interests of voters as this medium has the 
potential to provide electoral information to voters at a very low cost to them.139 
This brief discussion of stakeholder interests in the electoral institution seeks to raise issues for 
further discussion, particularly how parties' rights to disseminate their electoral position impact upon 
voters' rights to receive a breadth of electoral messages and the role of institutional bounds on these 
interests. It is important for courts, public bodies and legislators to look beyond the political veil 
created by the party system to all stakeholders in the electoral institution. The implications and 
importance of the advertising using the medium of broadcasting to all participants in an election 
should be recognised.140 Voters are not only the primary stakeholder in the electoral institution but 
are also its beneficiaries. In this regard, emphasis on the rights of parties to speak is only as 
important as the ability of voters to listen. 
IV CONCLUSION 
The New Zealand judiciary continues to play a significant role in the development of electoral 
law, particularly that relating to broadcasting, with cases like Alliance having important implications 
for actors in the electoral broadcasting arena. An examination of New Zealand's electoral legislation 
and case law evidences the emerging conception of an electoral institution. The use and recognition 
of this model can help to define electoral expression as a distinct category of expression, separate 
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from political communication, comprised of specific rules, norms and principles. This yields a basic 
definition of electoral expression as expression relating to the election of a particular candidate or 
party which may influence the outcome of an election and falling within a particular temporal 
constraint.  
Dunne and Ransfield are a striking contrast, giving an example of the weight courts may place 
on the nature of the electoral institution when they are scrutinising the treatment of expression. 
Those overtly acting in the broadcast of electoral expression should expect a higher judicial 
willingness to examine their behaviour. Further, those participating in this electoral sphere are also 
likely to be held to a higher stand of conduct, reflecting the importance of activity with direct 
influence on the democratic process. An institutionally bounded approach can have benefits for 
judges and counsel dealing with difficult matters involving a delicate balancing of rights where the 
recognition of a distinct category of electoral expression can aid argument. Mangu is a case in point. 
Had the Court considered the nature of its inquiry from the lens of an institutionally bounded 
conception of election expression it may have been possible, as it was in Dunne, to restrict 
amenability to review to the limited circumstance of an election. This would have avoided 
unnecessary fears of a "slippery-slope" of reviewability.  
Courts, legislators and policy makers have an important role to play in defining and balancing 
the nature of interests between different stakeholders within the electoral institution. It is important 
that the question of who the electoral institution serves is not too narrowly defined. While the 
interests of parties are significant, this should not obscure the interests of the key electoral 
stakeholders – voters – for whom the electoral process ultimately exists to serve. 
The concept of an electoral institution, and electoral expression defined with these bounds, is a 
useful concept that can assist courts and counsel when faced with the balancing of rights at election 
time. The approach of the courts has involved tacit recognition of this model, but a more express 
discussion of the special nature of elections and the balancing of rights therein would be valuable for 
actors in the electoral sphere. 
 
